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JOHN COLET AND THE ANNIHILATION OF THE NATURAL

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JOHN COLET (1466–1519) [1] resolved the bewildering tensions in the relation of man and God by attributing as much as possible to God and as little as possible to man. Spontaneously he destroys nature in order to exalt grace, feeling, as did St. Bonaventura, that pious souls, careful of the divine majesty, ascribe all things to God. He castigates the arrogance of those who imagine that they can know the true or will the good without the aid of grace. No reiteration of the radical insufficiency of man and nature is excessive. The core of his piety is a religious rejection of the world in which "all that belongs absolutely and essentially to man (who is nothing if not weak, foolish, evil, vain, lost and nought; whose power is weakness, his wisdom folly, his will malicious, his acting an undoing, his accomplishment destruction) all, I say, that goes to make up man is condemned with one voice and one judgement of the Spirit throughout the entire Holy Scriptures of God." [2]

Such a view of man and nature clearly separates Colet from the incipient secularisms of Renaissance humanism. He fears nature; the humanists respect it. He insists on the weakness and depravity of man; they urge his capacity and dignity, emphasize the freedom of his will, and exalt his rational ability to live a good and harmonious life. Colet was an ascetic reformer of the type of John Standonck and the Brothers of the Common Life, he was an educator

[1] The standard biography remains J. H. Lupton, A Life of John Colet (London, 1887). J. A. R. Marriott's The Life of John Colet (London, 1933) says nothing new pleasantly. Several important details will be found in Wallace K. Ferguson, "An Unpublished Letter of John Colet, Dean of St. Paul's," American Historical Review, XXXIX (1934), 696–99. The best recent general treatment of Colet's ideas is that of H. Maynard Smith, Pre-Reformation England (London, 1938), 452–463.

[2] Enarratio in Primam Epistolam S. Pauli ad Corinthios, J. H. Lupton, ed. and tr. (London, 1874), 247. Noted henceforth as Cor. My translations are based on those of Lupton. Page references are to the Latin text.

of importance, he was profoundly Christian; but he was not a humanist.[3] This myth dates from 1521, and its source is Erasmus' sophisticated biographical letter to Jodocus Jonas. An unconscious reluctance to recognize and accept basic doctrinal cleavages and his particular effort in 1521 to disassociate himself publicly but subtly from Luther's Augustinianism make this first Life little more than a crystallization of Erasmus' own religious attitudes. Colet emerges a typical Erasmian, hostile to both Augustine and Aquinas, a "primitive" theologian living, preaching, and teaching the *philosophia Christi* from the purest fountains of the Gospel. The portrait is elegant, persuasive and misleading.[4] Perpetuated by Seebohm's Oxford Reformers (1867) and Lupton's Life (1887), itself influenced by Seebohm, and sharpened, with a dash of Victorian nationalism, in the interests of Nineteenth Century liberal theology and scientific Biblical criticism, Erasmus' interpretation has dominated most subsequent writing.[5]

[3] He was, of course, influenced by humanism, as he was influenced by Florentine Neo-Platonism; but the influence was superficial, confined to stylistic precepts which he rarely followed himself. See the Statutes of St. Paul's School, Lupton, Life of Colet, Appendix A, 272 and 279–80 and his diatribe against the poets and philosophers (Cor., 238–9). A. Hyma, "The Continental Origins of English Humanism," Huntington Library Quarterly, IV (1940–41), 16, following a common practice, calls Colet "the true Christian humanist" because he "could say with Jesus Christ: 'I of myself can do nothing. The Father within me does all the works.'" The term "Christian humanism," as here, is based on the erroneous assumption that Christian piety is the essential distinction between Northern and Italian humanism. Its continued use only obscures a real issue: granted his piety, was Colet a humanist?

[4] The essential discrepancies — on the influence of Augustine, on monasticism, "primitive religion," the classics, predestination — have been outlined by A. Hyma, "Erasmus and the Oxford Reformers (1493–1503)," Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis, N.S. XXV (1932), 97–102. The key to the question of Colet's influence on Erasmus (Hyma, op. cit., 69 ff. and Karl Bauer, "John Colet und Erasmus von Rotterdam," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, Ergänzungsband V (1929), 156–8 review the literature) lies here; for if one accepts Erasmus' 1521 image of Colet as a true picture of the man he met at Oxford in the Fall of 1499, a discovery of Colet's ideas in the Enchiridion can cause no surprise, and a significant influence is established. If, on the contrary, Colet was not that man, and he was not, one proves only that the basic ideas of the Enchiridion are very similar to those Erasmus still held and attributed to Colet in 1521. Significant transformations in Erasmus' thought were determined, in fact, not by the Colet of the Lectures on Romans, but by the "liberal" theologian and humanist created by Erasmus and embellished by Seebohm. We meet the ironic situation of a man profoundly influenced by a biographical portrait he himself has sketched.

[5] Typical is Sidney Dark's essay on Colet in Five Deans (London, 1928): "He had read the Fathers and had already adopted the anti-Augustinian attitude that characterized all his teachng" (p. 26); or, speaking of Colet's "humanizing of reli-

In fact, however, the gap between Colet's ascetic theology and Erasmian humanism is as wide as that between Erasmus and Luther. Humanist religion is a *docta pieta*. Its ethical and educational ideal is the propagation of wisdom. Colet's piety is a radical abdication of the human and the rational, centering in charity and the love of God and culminating in man's mystical deification by grace. Yet he too insists that wisdom, when fused with love, is man's choicest perfection. Even this agreement is deceptive. Both speak of wisdom, but they mean quite different things by it.

The difference is important, for *sapientia* was a word of intellectual plenitude for Medieval and Renaissance thinkers. Its definition frequently involved discussions of the Trinity, it lay at the heart of the problem of faith and reason, and it was significantly related to problems of metaphysics and ethics. It offers a useful point of departure both for measuring, *via* a crucial concept, the difference between Colet and his humanist contemporaries and for a preliminary consideration of his denial of nature, which, because it is the axis of his thought, adequately defines that difference.

I

The Middle Ages had retained the traditional classical definition of *sapientia*: the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes.[6] Christianity, however, by distinguishing between divine and human reason and between "our" wisdom and that of the philosophers, had given it a meaning quite foreign to antique assumptions. Augustine, with his Platonizing epistemology, opposed *scientia* and *sapientia*, conceiving the latter as an essentially Christian insight, a participation in the divine wisdom, and frequently identifying it with Revelation. Aquinas too considered it,

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gion": "In his lectures and letters he is all the time concerned to accent its [Scripture's] ethical intention" (p. 30). Erasmus' influence is patent. In the same line is Kurt Schroeder, Platonismus in der Englischen Renaissance vor und bei Thomas Eliot, Palaestra, LXXXIII (Berlin, 1920), who refers (p. 16) to Sir Thomas More, "der im Gegensatz zu dem liberalen Colet ein strenger Katholik war. . . ." The most significant criticism of this traditional view is Hyma's important "Erasmus and the Oxford Reformers."

[6] Cicero, De Off., II, ii, 5. "Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur, scientia. . . ."

in its strictest sense, revealed Christian insight; but, just as nature is perfected and not destroyed by grace, so also is there no hostility between human and divine wisdom. Rather the higher completes and perfects the lower.[7]

Colet reverts to a dualism more extreme than Augustine's. He defines *sapientia* as the "knowledge of God and divine things," [8] narrowing the classical definition by omitting both the knowledge of things human and the reference to causes. Human wisdom is fundamentally opposed to divine wisdom in the same way that the order of nature is opposed to that of grace. It is *demonica;* for its contaminated source is the natural reason, which can not attain true knowledge, much less true wisdom, a good of a higher order. It is therefore despised and rejected by God and by Jesus Christ, who is himself *sapientia tandem, quasi humanata, in persona humana.*[9] The source and efficient cause of true wisdom, on the other hand, is illumination by the Spirit, through the grace of faith in Revelation.[10] Spiritual form replaces carnal chaos only when grace fires the unlighted lamp of the natural reason into a flaming *ratio spiritalis.* By it alone are men wise.

Thus identified with the principles of Revelation, wisdom must be classified under the head of faith and illumination. Man was given a mind that he might subject it to God, and so rise, drawn by grace, from error to faith, from foolishness to wisdom, from a self-reliance which is the essence of pride to a humble participation in the divine Wisdom through faith.[11] For faith is the wisdom of the intellect, and wisdom without faith is consequently a "lack of wisdom and a degeneration from true wisdom into what is lower and worse" [12] — an interpretation typical of the ascetic wing of

[7] In Boet. de Trin., qu. 2, art. 2, ad. 1. "Sapientia non dividitur contra scientiam, sicut oppositum contra oppositum, sed quia se habet ex additione ad scientiam." Quoted by M.-D. Chenu, La Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, 2nd. ed. (Paris, 1943), 107.

[8] Cor., 202. Cf. Ioannes Coletus Super Opera Dionysii. Two Treatises on the Hierarchies of Dionysius, J. H. Lupton, ed. and tr. (London, 1869), 242 where the wise man is called a *divinarum rerum contemplator.* Noted henceforth as Hierarchies.

[9] Cor., 171; 203; 238.

[10] Hierarchies, 240. "Illuminatio in fide est revelatis, quae est sapientia nostra."

[11] Enarratio in Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos, J. H. Lupton, ed. and tr. (London, 1873), 163. Noted henceforth as Rom.

[12] Cor., 166; Rom., 192. Cf. Rom., 182.

the Medieval Augustinian tradition. It differs from Aquinas in its anti-naturalism and in its hostile dualism of wisdom and knowledge; it differs from the humanists by continuing to assert the specifically Christian and Revelational character of *sapientia.*

It is precisely this disassociation of wisdom and Revelation which is the novel element in the humanist conception of *sapientia.* An unconscious secularism begins to drain the term of its specifically Christian meanings and replace them by approximations closer to the Ciceronian. A reintegration of antique word and antique meaning is apparent, paralleling the reintegration of classical motif and classical form which the art historians of the Warburg school consider the fundamental criterion of the Renaissance in art. The tendency is clear in Erasmus and Conrad Celtis, both typical representatives of the movement. In a conscious wish to return to what he calls *prisca illa sapientia,*[13] Celtis quotes the traditional definition in full and invests it with much of its old ethical and scientific significance. Once more *sapientia* includes a "love of astronomical and physical investigation," paralleling Cicero's praise of those "who devoted themselves to the contemplation of nature." [14] More commonly, and here too he follows the ancients, he emphasizes its ethical character; and locates the source of wisdom in the moral maxims of antiquity, in the *honestae artes* or the *bonarum artes disciplinae* "especially those which incite to living well and blessedly." [15] Wisdom is no longer an intellectual virtue specifically Christian and a gift of grace. It is becoming a practical virtue derived from the classical moralists. The result is a *de facto* identification of humanism and wisdom.

Erasmus continues this ethical emphasis in his discussion of wisdom in the third chapter of the Enchiridion Militis Christiani. Tending, like Cicero and like Celtis, to confuse *sapientia* and *prudentia,* he defines *sapientia* as the sum of those virtues opposed to *stultitia* and *malitia,* the generic names for vice of the Stoics and Christians respectively. He reflects the normal human-

[13] Quattuor libri amorum, Felicitas Pindter, ed. (Leipzig, 1934), IV, 4, ll. 21–22; Hans Rupprich, Der Briefwechsel des Konrad Celtis (Munich, 1934), ep. 179, l. 137.

[14] Oratio in gymnasio in Ingelstadio publice recitata, Hans Rupprich, ed. (Leipzig, 1932), 12. Tusc. Disp., V, iii, 8.

[15] Celtis to Prince Magnus von Anhalt, Rupprich, ep. 5, l. 43.

ist concern with ethics and its emphasis on the human nature of Christ as a pattern of moral conduct by finding the ultimate origin of wisdom in a Christ whose "very nature is virtue" and who is "the parent and author of all virtues." [16] Its immediate source, however, is irrespectively Scripture or the classical moralists. The wisdom of both is true. False wisdom or *saeculi sapientia*, on the other hand, characterizes the monks, who concern themselves only with trifles, ceremonies, or foolish observances while remaining ignorant of the things which alone assure us of salvation.[17] These, as the preface to the 1518 edition of the Enchiridion assures us, are nothing but a pure and simple life.[18] Wisdom, therefore, is the practical virtue which enables us to lead such a life. Its essence and first rule is self-knowledge, suggesting Socrates' maxim and Cicero's praise of him as the first to "call philosophy down from the heavens and set her in the cities of men and bring her also into their homes and compel her to ask questions about life and morality and things good and evil. . . ." [19] These questions the wise man answers by ethical insights derived from man and from his knowledge of himself.

Colet always insisted that man could never reform himself and that his wisdom came to him directly from Revelation. For Erasmus the insights of wisdom are natural products of the human reason. That Cicero, for example, was wise and that his was true wisdom is plain from the panegyrical preface to the De Officiis. It too is an enchiridion, and its teachings are sufficient to combat every vice. Celtis promised a blessed life to the follower of Ciceronian ethics; Erasmus promises immortality, making antique virtue a sufficient condition of salvation and denying the name Christian to those who lead evil lives.[20] This emphasis on the sufficiency

[16] Annemarie and Hajo Holborn, Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus Ausgewählte Werke (Munich, 1933), 38, ll. 13–17.

[17] Ibid., 39, ll. 12–13. The interpretation is clear from the context. J. B. Pineau's thesis that Erasmus wrote the Enchiridion to dissuade a youth from entering a monastery seems to me incontestable: Erasme, sa pensée religieuse (Paris, 1924), 106.

[18] Erasmus to Paul Volzius, Allen, III, ep. 858, l. 97. ". . . qui [Christus] a nobis praeter puram simplicemque vitam nihil exigit."

[19] Tusc. Disp., V, iv, 10–11. J. E. King, tr.

[20] Allen, I, ep. 152. The danger here to the sacraments was perfectly apparent to the carefully orthodox. Thus the Spanish translation of 1528 significantly qualifies the statement that those who lead evil lives are Christians only in name (Hol-

of ethics for salvation, and the opening of the whole field of necessary ethical knowledge to the natural reason, is the source of Erasmus' tendency to define Christianity as an ethically blameless life,[21] of his semi-Pelagianism, and of the celebrated invocation of St. Socrates. These tendencies in turn reflect the breakdown of the traditional Augustinian duality of *scientia* and *sapientia* and of Colet's more radical opposition of divine and human wisdom with its severe condemnation of the human. The rigid identification of *sapientia* with Revelation gradually gives way to a *prisca sapientia* whose primary source is the natural reason of the classical moralists. Colet classified wisdom under faith and illumination; Erasmus and Celtis under reason and *humanitas*.

II

Colet's definition of *sapientia* has an agreeable aura of necessity. It follows logically from and precisely reflects central characteristics of his thought: absence of *humanitas*, the hostile opposition of grace and nature, the necessary and destructive penetration of the natural by the divine. Previous, fundamental assumptions on the most suitable way to conceive the relation of God and the world make an Erasmian or Thomist solution equally impossible. For Colet denies in turn, or gravely undermines, the autonomy of secondary causes in nature; the possibility of a natural basis for the state and for political and social order; and, in the soul of man, the freedom of the will and the autonomy of the natural reason.

Deists respect God as a metaphysical guarantee of the regularity and efficacy of an autonomous realm of natural causation. Colet's God, personal, active, closer to man and intimately concerned with his affairs, weakens that autonomy by a more zealous Providence. The mason has his trowel, the architect his plan; and the plan properly guides the trowel. There is a similar relationship between

born, 39, ll. 8–9): "Estos tales no tienen otra cosa de christianos sino el nombre *y la crisma*. . . ." El Enquiridion O Manual del Caballero Cristiano, Damaso Alonso, ed. (Madrid, 1932), 153.

[21] Compare Colet's definition: "Christiani sunt homines, qui gracia Dei vocantur mirifice, ut sanctificentur, sanctique delectabiles sint filii Dei pulchri in Christo Jesu pulchrificante. . . ." Epistolae B. Pauli ad Romanos Expositio Literalis, Opuscula quaedam theologica, J. H. Lupton, ed. and tr. (London, 1876), 203. Noted henceforth as Expositio Lit.

secondary causes, or natural agents, and the First Cause. Thus, although natural, active causes "seem to us of themselves alone to act on, transmute and form external matter in their own likeness, they are not the primary causes of the things which take place [in nature], but rather instruments of the divine skill and working, whom they obey and serve." [22] Only the ascetically scrupulous, fearing that the attribution of efficacious causality to man or nature is a diminution of God's creative power, insist on such a causal interpenetration of the divine and natural; or then reinforce it by the introduction of seminal reasons. For Colet, following Augustine and the Florentine Neo-Platonists, goes on to argue that God impregnated matter at the moment of creation with the seeds from which all future forms emerge under the laws of divine Providence.[23] An animal, for example, is in no true sense the efficient cause of its own offspring. On the contrary, it is merely the superficial agent who extracts, under the immediate guidance of God, a form already pre-existent in matter. As a result, living beings are robbed of effective causality, the autonomy of secondary causes is seriously undermined, and any natural regularities in the physical world independent of the will of God are denied predictability and necessity. Natural processes, permeated by the divine, become increasingly indistinguishable from miracles.[24]

A similar penetration of nature by the divine is apparent in Colet's theory of the state and of the bases of political and social order. For Aquinas society had been the necessary result of the rationality and natural sociability of man. Social order, therefore, existed in the state of nature, a real order of the category *ordo creaturarum ad invicem* rather than *ad Deum*, that is, a natural order apart from that of redemption. On this foundation he asserted the natural origin of the state and of property and explained positive law as an adaptation of natural law. Political laws, sev-

[22] Cor., 258. Colet is paraphrasing Pico della Mirandola, Heptaplus, Edizione Nazionale, E. Garin, ed. (Florence, 1942), I, 204–206.

[23] In Principium Genesios, Opuscula quaedam theologica, 174–75. Cf. J. McKeough, The Meaning of the rationes seminales in St. Augustine (Washington, 1926) and Pico della Mirandola, op. cit., I, 208 and 298.

[24] An immediate corrolary, and Colet draws it, is that *omnis naturae cognitio* may be found in Scripture. Hierarchies, 222 (see below, note 39). Cf. Hierarchies, 196 where demons are described as "acuta acie naturalia contemplantes, longo experimento et usu callidi. . . ."

ered thus from theology, existed before grace and were not abolished by grace: *gratia non tollit naturam sed perficit*, in his own lapidary phrase. Colet, however, fears nature, and assumes that its corrupt law has been "exploded and hissed off the stage by the law of faith and charity." [25] Reverting to pre-Aristotelian commonplaces of the early Middle Ages, he denies the natural origin of the state and of property, and brands the "systems of civil law which every state had before Christ and without Christ" as "particular corruptions from the general depravity." [26] Behind these judgments lies Colet's denial of a natural social order outside of the order of grace. Absence of order, absence indeed of society, is the essential characteristic of the natural realm. Disunited, dispersed, dismembered, men drift through it "purposeless and disorganized, without order, without form, without goodness, incapable of justice, everyone deserted by God. . . ." [27] The destruction of the autonomy of reason by the fall of man eliminates the only sufficient condition for natural sociability. Social order, thus deprived of any natural basis, flows only from the Spirit of God, who alone can "restore, reform, reunite, and retain men constantly in beauty and good action and in a mutual association of natures." [28] Society, spontaneously equated with the Church, the mystical body, receives its only possible form and harmony in the order of grace, destroying nature, univocal, the *ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo* of Augustine.[29]

The anti-naturalism of Colet's social theory flows ultimately from and parallels his emphasis on the natural incapacity of the soul's chief faculties, reason and will. The problem of free will, as Erasmus wearily noted in the opening sentence of the *De libero arbitrio*, is an "inextricable labyrinth." Colet plunged into it with passion, and emerged with a view which, in its major lines, reproduces Augustine. There are contradictions, softenings, philosophical ineptitudes (particularly in the treatment of divine fore-

[25] Expositio Lit., 263.

[26] Ibid., 260.

[27] De Compositione sancti corporis Christi mystici, quae est ecclesia, Opuscula quaedam theologica, 186.

[28] Ibid., 187.

[29] De civ. Dei, XIX, 13. 1. Quoted by Etienne Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1949), 228, note 2.

knowledge); but in the end we find that Adam was able not to sin, that man possessed by grace is not able to sin, and that man unaided by grace can merely choose between different degrees of sin.

Colet revels in the Augustinian antinomies: "Without grace, indeed, there is no liberty; and yet in grace there is nothing but liberty"; or, "unless a man will, he does not receive the light; and unless he is enlightened, he does not will to receive it." [30] Free will is defined as a constant inclination towards the good alone, a freedom for good. But in practice men of themselves can neither will nor do a righteous act; [31] and since evil can never be cured by evil, remedy and reparation must be sought from a source external to man, that is from God. Freedom is God's gift to a will created to receive it. Gratuitously, by an "arbitrary election," God's grace mysteriously selects certain souls for salvation. They themselves contribute nothing toward their election "lest the plan and purpose of God seem to depend on the will and deeds of men." [32] On the contrary, those who love God love him because he has first loved them. He alone can drain their wills of malice and enable them to execute the good works they will. Inscrutably, for as John says, "the Spirit bloweth where it listeth," the gaps left by the fallen angels are filled by the elect, whom a sweet and irresistible grace has drawn out of the formless iniquity of the natural state.[33]

This is close to predestination,[34] a suitable guarantee of the majesty and omnipotence of the will of God, an insistence that "whatever there is which affects the blessedness of mankind, rests

[30] Hierarchies, 183. The quotations form part of an excursus on free will independent of the Pseudo-Dionysius.

[31] Cor., 223.

[32] Rom., 163. Cf. De Compositione, 186.

[33] Rom., 142. "Verum magnificae potestati dulcis et suavis graciae, quae molliter mirabiliterque, et vi quadam latenti ac mirifica agit, nihil potest resistere." The resistibility of grace is clearly stated, however, in Cor., 75; Rom., 36; Hierarchies, 183.

[34] Frederic Seebohm, The Oxford Reformers, 3rd. ed. (London, 1887), 36 ff. compares Colet's views to those of Savonarola. He denies that Colet's position on free will can be described as Augustinian. But cf. Hyma, "Erasmus and the Oxford Reformers," 102, who notes the similarity to Luther's 1515–1516 Wittenberg lectures.

wholly on the purpose and will and grace of God." [35] Men can perhaps freely reject the light, but throughout the process of justification and salvation *per se*, his will remains quite passive. Only after grace has re-formed it into a new and spiritual faculty can any righteousness or any power be ascribed to it without diminishing God. In a question so intimately related to salvation Colet is confident that the denial of man can only enhance humility and respect.

An insistence on man's humility and God's majesty is the core of his piety. It is the piety of an ascetic, a rigid celibate, a reformer and mystic who systematically destroys the natural in order to preserve the divine omnipotence and goodness from any hint of mockery or derogation. Colet has been called a Puritan; [36] and, by analogy, the scope of his rejections justifies this. His state of nature anticipates Hobbes and recalls Cicero's *magna latrocinia*. In it men's virtues are merely shining sins; their wisdom the foolishness of Paul. They live wildly without society or love in a universe whose laws have no secondary autonomy beyond the immediate will of God. They are blind, deformed and infinitely far from God, a *massa peccati* — the phrase is that of Gregory of Rimini — whose freedom is only for malice, whose noblest act is the rejection of the good, and whose self-fulfillment is necessarily in opposition to God. For as faith is the wisdom of the intellect, so is love the power of the will. Both flow only from God, through Christ, who is the *virtus*, that is, the power and wisdom of God.[37] Alone, man is powerless and foolish.

III

Behind the absence of a natural community and man's incapacity to act and will lies the inability to know. Just as grace destroys the natural bases of science, politics and ethics, Revelation and the divine illumination of faith destroy the autonomy of the natural reason. The hostile tension between faith and reason, underlying that between human and divine wisdom, natural causation and Providence, free will and divine omnipotence, human law

[35] Rom., 163.
[36] Smith, Pre-Reformation England, 452.
[37] Cor., 166.

and divine law, is the central opposition which flows from Colet's destructive dualism of grace and nature. He resolves it by reducing human reason to an almost total scepticism and making divine illumination the sole condition of certitude. Natural theology and an autonomous philosophy are equally impossible.

No Christian philosopher, of course, could doubt that the truths of Revelation were superior to and completed those of reason. Philosophy was the handmaiden of theology. If a philosophical doctrine conflicted with the infallible truth of Revelation, it was clearly an error. On the other hand, no one doubted that human reason itself was a gift of God and, as such, good and perfect of its kind, however corrupted by the fall. These were propositions universally accepted; divergencies began with questions of a less general kind.

The most immediate of these was the character of the mind's assent to Scripture. Professor Wolfson has outlined three positions on the relation of faith and reason which turn on this question: the double faith theory in which true faith is the assent to Scripture with or without the aid of philosophy; a single faith theory of the rationalist type in which true faith is the assent to Scripture with the aid of philosophy; and finally an authoritarian single faith theory demanding an assent to Scripture without the aid of philosophy.[38] Colet clearly urges a single faith theory of the authoritarian type. Echoing Peter Damiani's distinction between devilish philosophy and divine theology, he condemns reading the philosophers, "companions of devils." The whole truth is to be found in Scripture.[39] The rest is either devilish error or, at best, unnecessary. "Now if any should say, as is often said, that reading heathen books aids one in understanding Scripture, let them reflect whether the very fact of such reliance being placed upon them does not make them a chief obstacle to such under-

[38] H. A. Wolfson, Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Harvard University Press, 1948), I, 156.

[39] Hierarchies, 222. "Si quidem in illis [Scriptures] omnis sapientia et bonitas continetur, omnis naturae cognitio, omnis metaphisicae speculatio, omnis bonorum morum institutio, omnium praeteritorum Dei recordatio, omnium futurorum expectacio, omnis denique veri et boni fides et amor: ut praeterea quod recitetur auscultandum et inculcetur in auribus hominum nihil sit reliquum." This is a paraphrase of De Eccl. Hierarch., III, iii, 4, except for the phrase "omnis naturae cognitio, omnis metaphisicae speculatio," which was added by Colet himself.

standing." [40] For the understanding of Scripture emerges only through grace, prayer and faith; and true faith is an assent to its mysteries unaided and unclarified by reason. Approvingly Colet notes that Paul and Dionysius "considered it an unworthy thing for human reason to be mixed up with divine Revelation. Nor would they have it thought that the truth was believed through the persuasion of men rather than through the power of God." [41]

An immediate corollary to this view is a tendency to deprecate the use of reason in theology. During the Twelfth Century theology had been gradually transformed from descriptive positive exegesis, closely tied to the Fathers and the sacred text, into an analytical and systematic discipline. It became, in fact, a *scientia*, a systematically ordered body of true and certain knowledge derived from the certain, but undemonstrable principles of Revelation, rather than a *sapientia* whose primary aim was more the stimulation of love than knowledge of the truth. It is this theology as *scientia*, with its rigorous logic, its distinctions and definitions, which is properly called scholastic. St. Bernard and the Victorines denounced it in the Twelfth Century, many defenders of theology as *sapientia* opposed it in the Thirteenth, and the Dutch and German mystics, their piety and scepticism perfectly preserved in the Imitatio Christi, attacked its subtleties and vain curiosity in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth.

Colet was deeply embedded in this tradition of late Medieval piety, and disliked scholastic theology for the same reasons. Erasmus reports that he was particularly hostile to Aquinas: "Why do you extol that writer to me? If he had not been full of arrogance, he would never have defined everything so rashly and so overbearingly; and without something of a worldly spirit he would not have contaminated the whole doctrine of Christ with his own profane philosophy." [42] Erasmus, characteristically, had praised the author of the Catena aurea. Colet, however, was attacking the architect of theology as *scientia*, a celebrated representative of the scholastic method in theology, and the advocate of a double faith theory which considered true faith an assent to Revelation

[40] Cor., 238.
[41] Cor., 171.
[42] Allen, IV, ep. 1211, ll. 438–441.

with and without the aid of philosophy. For he himself held a single faith theory and felt that all theological writing should be, like his own, essentially positive and exegetical, in the form of sermons or commentaries. Its proper end should be the inflammation of man's love for God; its conditions prayer, divine illumination and grace.[43] He shared with Thomas à Kempis the mystic's impatience with the "too curious inquisition" of the divine mysteries. Here the frivolities of reason could be only a profanation.

Barring philosophical speculations from theology, although a depreciation of the natural reason, need not involve a confusion of the respective spheres of faith and reason. That there was a real and practical difference between them was firmly established in the Thirteenth Century, while the fundamental theoretical distinction had been recognized since Augustine's *quod credimus debemus auctoritati, quod intellegimus ratione* [44] Colet recognizes this distinction. It is implicit in every discussion of faith and reason; explicit in his treatment of pagan philosophy and its knowledge of God derived from sense experience. Philosophical knowledge is acquired by reason alone, its point of departure is sense experience, its certitude is based on reason. Faith, on the other hand, proceeds downward from Revelation, and its certitude lies in an adhesion of the will through love, a product of divine grace. The two are distinct in the sources of their first principles, in their methods, and in their criteria of certitude.

[43] It is in this context of the mystical tradition after Gerson; of the widespread Fifteenth Century reaction against the excesses of Terminist logic and the *modus legendi cum quaestionibus* (G. Ritter, Studien zur Spätscholastik, II. Sitzb. d. Heidelberg. Akad. d. Wiss., VII (Heidelberg, 1922), 34 and 103); and of the common Neo-Platonist penchant for the esoteric (Pico della Mirandola, op. cit., I, 156) that Colet's ideas on Biblical exegesis must be seen. What Seebohm (Oxford Reformers, 52) called the doctrine of "accomodation" is in fact a mystical theory of Scriptural interpretation whose chief immediate source was Pseudo-Dionysius, De Coeles. Hierarch., I, iii; II, i and iii; De Eccles. Hierarch., I, iv–v. (Cf. Schroeder, Platonismus, 23). It involves no particular attachment to the literal sense. In the commentary on Genesis, for example, it is explicitly directed against the literal sense (see also Hierarchies, 235). Nor does it make Colet a "liberal" who stands for "the application of historical and scientific methods to the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures" (Marriott, Life of Colet, 6). It remains true, nevertheless, that Colet's Pauline commentaries show a more developed historical sense than do those of many of his contemporaries — Jacques Lefèvre d'Etaples', for example.

[44] De utilitate credendi, XI, 25. Quoted by Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, Illtyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed, trs. (New York, 1940), 91.

A theoretical appreciation of the distinction between faith and reason, however, neither guarantees the autonomy of rational knowledge nor asserts that such knowledge is ultimately worthwhile. On the contrary, Colet frequently emphasizes the weakness and insufficiency of the natural reason. Reason is the light of the soul, a participation in the divine light and reason of which it is the lowest emanation. It has been deteriorated and weakened on its downward progress; but it remains perfect of its kind, and Adam could use it to acquire certain knowledge. The fall, however, brought a radical deterioration, leaving the light of man's intellect "obscured and almost extinguished." Reason became a "dense gloom," a "blindness," full of "fickleness and incapacity," weak and feeble, "purblind and sightless before the light of God and divine things," plunged in the waves of this world.[45] As a result men of themselves have neither wisdom (*sapientia*) nor true knowledge (*scientia*), for they are foolish, ignorant, and bad.[46] Their wisdom is empty and false; their knowledge uncertain or at best useless and unprofitable. "Human reason," says Colet in his most extreme statement, "is the enemy and opponent of grace." [47]

A more detailed exploration of the capacity, or incapacity, of the natural reason modifies and clarifies this statement. What can the unaided reason know? What is closed to it and why? The mind is finite and infinitely far from God. This diminishes man's understanding of the divine, but secures his knowledge of "things present and set before the eye." Normally Colet lays little stress on the deceptiveness of the senses *per se*. The disparate particulars of sense experience can be known with reasonable certainty. They are, furthermore, a significant means of achieving a natural knowledge of God. "Men were taught by God in three ways and methods: by His sensible creation; by His spiritual and angelic creation; and by His son, very God, co-eternal with Him. By His sensible creation He manifested himself to every creature, that is to every man. By the angelic spirits and by his works, He showed himself still more openly to the chosen Jews. By His son,

[45] Rom., 163–66; Cor., 168; 180.

[46] Cor., 246.

[47] Expositio Lit., 263. "Humana ratio inimica et adversaria est graciae: legem suam constituentes legi Dei non sunt subjecti."

made man, He revealed himself far most clearly and intimately of all to the most chosen of all, even Christians." [48] Reasoning, therefore, from created and sensible things, the ancient philosophers could ascend to the knowledge of God's existence and know certain of His attributes: that He is one, unchanging and eternal; good, beautiful and mighty. Thus man "in this world can to a certain degree understand the things of God, which are beyond sight and sense." [49]

Colet is careful to make this "certain degree" as small yet as autonomous as possible. He emphasizes the mind's incapacity to know adequately heavenly things, to say nothing of things divine in themselves, which surpass "by the vastest possible interval not only weak men but the most exalted angels. . . ." [50] He castigates the Greeks, who "imagined that they could detect the true and false in everything by their own intellectual powers. . . . By no human resources, by no faculty of reason even in its highest vigour, by no spirit of the world, by no supports of human learning and eloquence . . . is man enabled to soar to the designs and acts of God, placed as they are far above all human reason, in his own absolute reason and will." [51] And he insists that the knowledge of God acquired from His creatures is ultimately a form of Revelation, just as the human mind itself is ultimately a gift of grace.[52] It remains true nevertheless that pagan philosophers knew of the existence of a unitary God; and nowhere does he suggest that they had received divine illumination. Their knowledge was radically limited, it was, as will become evident, not even true knowledge; but it was autonomous and their own.

The estimation of the ancients, and consequently of the natural reason, on which Colet based this judgment was harsh. The frequently timid Robert Gaguin had concluded that "reading the philosophers is dangerous to all but wise and well-trained minds"; [53] Colet condemned them out of hand. Even the complaisant Eras-

[48] Expositio Lit., 213.

[49] Ibid., 210–12; 203. The scriptural text is Romans, 1, 20. "Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque eius virtus, et divinitas. . . ."

[50] Rom., 163.

[51] Cor., 176–77.

[52] Expositio Lit., 201; 210.

[53] Epistole et Orationes, Louis Thuasne, ed. (Paris, 1904), II, 37.

mus noted his hostility to the poets.[54] The humanists, on the contrary, found both poets and philosophers teeming with salubrious matter. They considered their natural knowledge true knowledge, and not infrequently found in them examples of the monastic virtues and even foreshadowings of the Trinity. To account for this fecundity of theological truth before the Christian era, like Abelard before them, they frequently represented the pagans as partial recipients of divine illumination. Thus Conrad Celtis found basic principles of Christianity in Plato and Pythagoras, "who combine in the most admirable way the light of nature with that of grace." [55] Jacques Lefèvre d'Etaples describes Aristotle and other "pious philosophers" as divinely illuminated: "And even though God who illumines all men had not yet appeared visibly in the world, nevertheless, He who is an unlimited and infinite light shining on every age shone down on them from heaven." [56] Paradoxically it is the humanists who, by claiming too much, blur the line between faith and reason. Colet, lacking their excessive zeal, insists that the antique philosophers were not divinely illuminated precisely because his anti-humanist mind found so little of value and truth in them; or put conversely, because he is committed to the proposition that true knowledge of God is inaccessible to a reason unaided by faith.

It is for this reason that the ancients' demonstration of God's existence and unity could not conceivably become the basis for a natural theology. In the first place, true knowledge demands love as well as a purely intellectual act. Paul, for example, told the Corinthians that their knowledge of one God was useless and dangerous unless they also loved Him. Knowledge without love is foolishness, and "no matter how great our knowledge may be, it is worthless without the love of God." [57] True knowledge presupposes a union of the act of knowing and the act of loving, and the latter comes from grace alone. In the second place, our aim in

[54] Allen, IV, ep. 1211, ll. 563–4.

[55] Oratio, 95.

[56] Dedicatory epistle to Germain de Ganay, Introductio in metaphysicorum libros Aristotelis. J. Higman (Paris, 1493).

[57] Cor., 231. In Rom., 155–57 Colet supports this by an extended quotation on the superiority of love to knowledge of God from Ficino's Theologia Platonica, Opera Omnia (Basel, 1576), I, 324. Lupton, Rom., 29, note 1. Cf. Hierarchies, 204; 219.

any case is to see God, not to demonstrate his existence. Men do have some knowledge of divine things; but they must be reminded first "that things of this sort, far transcending as they do the human mind, cannot be scrutinized by them; and secondly that if they wish to scrutinize them, they must be changed from the state in which they are . . . to the divine state. . . ." [58] Faith therefore is not excluded by a philosophical proof. On the contrary, it amplifies and perfects it, leading to a higher order of knowledge, and the only true one, in which "faith illumines to the knowledge of things revealed." [59] Knowledge of God must properly embrace both faith and reason. Every shred of natural knowledge which we possess must be enriched and completed by an act of faith and an act of love. These are products, however, of divine grace; and so it follows that only knowledge with a Christian bias is true knowledge.

There is thus a double reason for neglecting the philosophers. Any kernel of truth found in them has been better said in the Scriptures, which contain all truth. These kernels, furthermore, are embedded in a structure which is devilish, whose premises are fallacious and whose ends mistaken. Such knowledge must necessarily remain incomplete and crippled precisely because it does not proceed from the centrally seized *principium* of the Triune and Incarnate God, a principle totally above reason, and yet the only center around which true knowledge can be organized. Colet therefore concludes that real truth "is understood by grace; grace is procured by our prayers being heard; our prayers are heard when whetted by devotion and strengthened by fasting. To have recourse to other means is mere infatuation." [60]

As there is no natural theology, so also is there no independent philosophy. True philosophy is the work of a reason illumined and guided by faith. This follows from Colet's typically mystical epistemology: an almost total scepticism immediately rescued by grace. The end of philosophy, as of all thought, is God and divine things. God is infinite and immutable. He is pure Truth, necessary and eternal. The human mind, on the other hand, is divided,

[58] Rom., 164.
[59] Cor., 256.
[60] Cor., 239.

feeble and can know only finite, particular and contingent objects.

How then can the mind possibly know the intelligible and the divine? How can it have certain metaphysical knowledge at all? Colet rejects any solution made possible by positing innate ideas. He can not say with Matthew of Aguasparta, a disciple of Bonaventura, that the existence of sensible things is unnecessary for true human knowledge; for if the light of the eternal reasons were innate and if this illumination were not equated with grace, knowledge could still conceivably remain both natural and certain. Rather he maintains, on the one hand, that human knowledge must originate in sense experience; [61] and, on the other, that the unaided reason can nevertheless not know what he calls *nudas rerum rationes* [62] or *simplices rationes divinaeque et spiritales*, the divine and spiritual reasons in their simplicity.[63] Human reason, that is, can neither know the ideas in the mind of God nor, more significantly, proceed unaided from the particular to the intelligible. The element of necessity and certitude which characterizes knowledge of intelligibles is introduced into a reason essentially finite and contingent by divine illumination: through faith in Christ, the *ratio Dei in homine*; [64] through the revelational images of Scripture, which adequately contain all metaphysical speculation; [65] or by virtue of the esoteric wisdom of the Cabala, which derives from a revealed *prophetali spiritu.*[66] The "truths of the intelligible world," the " divine and spiritual reasons," the "naked reasons of things" are open only to "those of the very highest spiritual power, those who are wholly concentrated on the One, and who, despising the body and the world, stand unshaken

[61] Expositio Lit., 201. ". . . invisibiliaque et intelligibilia manifestavit [Deus] per creaturam sensibilem. . . ." See above, note 49.

[62] Hierarchies, 203.

[63] Cor., 181.

[64] Cor., 203. Cf. the excellent page on Colet's Christology in Schroeder, Platonismus, 34 where he remarks that "Jesus ist gekommen, die Menschen zur Anschauung der überirdischen Welt zu führen!"

[65] Hierarchies, 222. See above, note 39.

[66] Hierarchies, 238–9. "Sed Cabala anagogicum sensum persequitur . . . sursum nos trahens et ducens a terrenis ad celestia, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia, a temporalibus ad eterna, ab infimis ad suprema, ab humanis ad divina, a corporalibus ad spiritualia." Like the passage on free will (see above, note 30) this forms part of an excursus independent of the Pseudo-Dionysius. The source is Pico della Mirandola, Oratio de hominis dignitate, Edizione Nationale, I, 156–8. Cf. Hierarchies, 203.

on the loftiest mental pinnacle, on the one, indivisible center." [67]

It is faith, a spiritual light bestowed on the minds of men by God, which concentrates and unifies the mind, raising it to the one, indivisible center: an unshaken belief in Christ. Colet defines it with Augustine as the virtue by which we believe in unseen things [68] or as a "gentle, agreeable and clear intelligence of things, cherishing and strengthening the soul and preserving its purity." [69] It streams its illumination down "from the Soul of souls, even God," making every sense true [70] and providing the necessary condition for true metaphysical knowledge. Aided by it, reason can relate a class of beings to their eternal essences and their exemplary causes and know the divine reasons. Natural man is a nominalist; grace enables him to become a realist. The act of knowledge must therefore combine the light of reason with that of grace. True knowledge can never be purely rational, nor can true philosophy have autonomy. A true philosophy is a Christian philosophy, constructed by a reason guided by faith and illuminated by grace.

Colet works out his doctrine of divine illumination with great beauty. Its central concepts are the Aristotelian ones of form and matter as these were understood by the Florentine Neo-Platonists.[71] He compares the formation of primal matter at the moment of creation to the Holy Spirit's re-formation of the soul. The soul of carnal man is disunited, devoid of spiritual form, with a gross will and a blind reason. The Spirit, moulding the shapeless soul like soft wax, gives it a new and spiritual form. There "arises a new thing by the divine working, compounded of the soul itself as the matter, and the embracing spirit as the formative principle." [72] As the soul is the form of the body, so, and in a far more splendid way, is the Spirit the form of the illuminated soul. Man receives a new and spiritual form whose intellect is faith in God

[67] Cor., 181.
[68] Expositio Lit., 230–31.
[69] Rom., 192.
[70] Rom., 178.
[71] Colet's immediate source was Pico della Mirandola, Heptaplus, I, 204. Lupton, Cor., 138, note 2. Colet's interpretation includes a belief in the hylomorphic composition of spiritual substances. In Principium Genesios, 169.
[72] Rom., 154. Cf. Cor., 258.

and whose will is charity and love of Him.[73] He flowers with the theological virtues. Beautiful order succeeds shapelessness. Thus reformed, men are holy, wise and good; and "being made like Gods, may become Gods." [74]

The intellectual results are marvellous. Deified by the light infused into the human soul by the divine sun, which "as far excells the light of reason as certainty does uncertainty, or as the solar light does colors," man knows the heavenly verities "without uncertainty or doubt." [75] Good can be distinguished from bad, true from false, what is harmonious with the faith from what is not. Man has a "clear discernment and judgment of all things" and "can see what is abroad with perfect truth." [76] This is done by the common sense and the imagination; but reason, that is a reformed, spiritual reason, does it in a far more excellent degree.[77] Man has received, in short, the gift of *sapientia*.

Ultimately Colet's position on the relation of faith and reason only intensifies that of the Augustinian tradition: *credo ut intelligam*. No single item of our true knowledge is fully natural. Reason is fundamentally incompetent to achieve true knowledge or a true philosophy without the aid of Revelation which gives it its end, the Trinity, and of divine illumination which assures its certitude by re-forming it into a spiritual reason able to grasp divine and intelligible truths. An act of faith is the first step of the intellectual ascent to God. Illumined by the grace of faith and spiritually reformed, the soul exhibits a new faculty: the *ratio spiritalis*, natural reason divinely illuminated by faith. From it flows a series of acts of knowledge which, intimately combining reason and faith, lead to as full a knowledge of God as is possible in this life. Man, like a spider, sits at the "one, indivisible center," his initial act of faith in Christ. Strengthened and unified by this principle, he orders all the rest of his knowledge and experience by it, moving

[73] Rom., 167. "Intellectus autem spiritus est fides Deo; voluntas vero ejusdem est charitas et amor Dei."

[74] Cor., 171.

[75] Rom., 165. Cf. Hierarchies, 240.

[76] Rom., 208; 167.

[77] Rom., 189. "Communis sensus et phantasma haec omnia facit, et supra phantasma racio modo excellentiori; racio inquam spiritalis." For the spiritual man "custodiat justicias legis spiritalis, circumcidatque se a mundo et carne, a phantasmate et ratione, extiteritque Deo simplici et nuda fide. . . ." Expositio Lit., 222.

outward along the strands of his web and returning with intellectual trophies. This is the sole principle of certitude and the only one on which a true philosophy can be constructed. All else is death. Any lapse from faith into one's "own weakness and private opinion is clearly a madness and folly of the soul, feverish now, raging arrogantly and roaming in darkness; for it is foresaken by the suave serenity of faith, which is the sweet life of the soul, its light and stability, calming the soul, focusing it on the One, and not allowing it to fall away from unity and trust in God." [78]

* * *

It is now clear that Colet's thought is split by two parallel dualisms: form and matter, grace and nature. Its radicalism is a result of the identification of these dualisms. The natural, whether the law of nature or the faculties of the soul, is literally conceived as chaotic matter. Form, on the other hand, the principle of order and intelligibility, can be introduced only through grace. Thus the hostile dispersion of men in the state of nature receives the form of society from the Holy Spirit, and the disorganized matter of the will and intellect is re-formed by grace and divine illumination into the theological virtues of faith and charity. A new and spiritual reason furnishes the rationality and wisdom which are the conditions of human community and of the ability to distinguish good from evil, while the newly spiritualized will receives the strength and freedom to act on this intelligence. Of itself nature is nothing; only the Spirit truly is, and from it proceed immediately all form and all being. Grace penetrates every area of nature and every human faculty, transforming man from a disordered slave who can not will the good nor know the true into a unified being within the hierarchical order of grace and redemption. Man is totally dependent on God for his wisdom, certitude, society and freedom. His reason and will have no inherent independence, and the spheres in which he acts and knows have no autonomy. This is the annihilation of the natural.

Humanism, on the other hand, situates man harmoniously in nature. The society in which he lives is capable of the natural

[78] Rom., 192. Cf. Hierarchies, 193.

perfections of More's Utopia; and the faculties of his soul, reason and will, are free and potently autonomous. No art, according to Cardinal Sadoleto, escapes his intelligence and penetration. He is naturally capable, like the ancients, of both "a most blessed life" and "the full might and glory of perfect wisdom." [79] There is, in short — Pico della Mirandola is esoterically quoting Abdala the Saracen — "nothing to be seen more wonderful than man." Colet, however, and the judgment lies at the center of his intellectual and emotional life, called man a "withered fruit stinking in the nostrils of God." The line is clear.

[79] Opera omnia (Verona, 1738), III, 121, col. 2; 125, col. 1.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ANCIENT PORTO

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Among the 734 inscriptions included in the first volume of Frey's Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaicarum [1] there are twenty-one (CII 535–551e) which are listed as from the Jewish community of Porto, the ancient Portus Traiani. There have been so many misstatements and differences of opinion among scholars with reference to the Jews of Porto that a fresh study of the data is appropriate.

When the harbor of Ostia became inadequate both because of the gradual silting up of the mouth of the Tiber and the increase in Rome's overseas trade, a new harbor became necessary. Julius Caesar had contemplated the construction of such a harbor, but, according to Suetonius (Claud. 20.1), he had given up the plan because of its difficulty. Claudius, however, undertook the vast project and completed it (Suet. Claud. 20.3, Dio 60.11.2–4). In the course of time, as the Claudian port in its turn became insufficient to handle the enormous demands of the capital for foreign goods, Trajan expanded the harbor by constructing a huge octagonal basin adjoining it. As the harbor and its traffic increased, a flourishing town called Portus Traiani developed there. The remains of the harbor and of the town, some two miles northwest of the site of ancient Ostia, have been excavated at various times since the 1780's, and notably in 1864–1870 by the owner of the territory, Prince Torlonia. In the 1930's the Agro Portuense was developed as a model farming community.[2]

The first announcement of the presence of Jewish inscriptions at Porto seems to have been made by the great Christian archaeologist

[1] J. B. Frey, Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaicarum I: Europe (Città del Vaticano, 1936). References to the inscriptions from this Corpus will be cited as CII followed by the number of the inscription.

[2] A full account of Porto from ancient to modern times is given in G. Lugli and G. Filibeck, Il Porto di Roma Imperiale e l'Agro Portuense (Rome 1935). For the earlier excavations see Carlo Fea, Relazione di un viaggio ad Ostia, etc. (Rome 1802), especially pp. 43–56.

De Rossi in 1866.[3] Citing a few of the texts and promising to publish them later, a promise which was not fulfilled, he observed that Jews would have found in Porto a favorable location because of its commercial importance and that there must certainly have been one or more synagogues established there prior to the fourth century.[4] Two years later Lanciani, in a major article on the topography of Porto, published two additional Jewish inscriptions and spoke of the important Jewish colony established there.[5] The first attempt at fully presenting at least the more important of the Jewish inscriptions of Porto was made in 1886 by Le Blant, who offered the texts, though inaccurately, of six inscriptions which he stated had been found in 1822 by Cardinal Bartolommeo Pacca, Bishop of Porto, in the territory of Porto and which were at that time in the Bishop's Palace, affixed to the walls around the *cortile*.[6] In the following year the Orientalist, Joseph Derenbourg, wrote of the large number of Jews who settled in ancient Porto to occupy themselves with the export and import trade and whose existence as a community was established beyond any doubt by the inscriptions found at the site. He offered the texts of four of these with a translation and a commentary by no means free from errors.[7] J. Ficker, in a monograph on the early Christian monuments of the Lateran Museum, was the first to publish the inscription of Marciana with its reference to a *proarchon*.[8] This stone, according to Ficker, had been found at Porto by Prince Torlonia in 1866 and had been presented to the Lateran in 1868 along with other materials uncovered in his excavations there.[9] Among these were seven late composite capitals from the ruins of a hostelry for Christian pilgrims (*xenodocheion*) built by a certain Pammachius about the year 398 and abandoned, apparently, dur-

[3] Bull. Arch. Crist. 4 (1866), 37–41.

[4] Bull. Arch. Crist. 4 (1866), 40. There is actually little or no evidence that the Jews of ancient times had a particular leaning toward commerce.

[5] "Ricerche topografiche sulla città di Porto," Ann. Ist. Corr. Arch. 40 (1868), 144–195. For the Jewish inscriptions see p. 191.

[6] CRAI 14 (1886), 194–196. The date 1822 is that recorded on the plaque set up in the *cortile* by the Cardinal and still there.

[7] Mélanges Renier (Paris, 1887), 437–441. See infra n. 27.

[8] Die altchristlichen Bildwerke im christlichen Museum des Laterans (Leipzig, 1890), 36. De Rossi had alluded to this inscription in 1866, op. cit. (supra, n. 3), 40.

[9] Ficker op. cit. (supra, n. 8), 29.

ing the seventh or the eighth century.[10] One of these capitals is of especial interest in this connection, since between the corner volutes on each of the four faces some person had very crudely punched out with a pointed instrument the outline of the seven-branched candelabrum (*Menorah*), which is accepted as an unquestioned symbol of Judaism.[11]

In view of this accumulation of evidence, scholars have regarded it as established beyond any doubt that there was a flourishing Jewish community at Porto, the members of which were primarily engaged in commerce. There remained, however, a few unsolved problems. First, did the Porto group form one or more independent congregations or were they members of the synagogues at Rome, which was only thirteen miles distant? The latter alternative seemed to be the more probable,[12] since the names of the two synagogues mentioned in the Porto inscriptions were apparently the same as those of synagogues in Rome, namely, the Synagogue of the Hebrews and that of the "Carcaresians," the latter being most likely an erroneous writing for "Calcaresians," which was the name of the Roman synagogue. It is likely that both these synagogues were in the Transtiberine region of Rome, since their members buried their dead in the Monteverde catacomb just off the Via Portuensis, which led to Porto.[13] Another uncertain point was whether or not there was a Jewish cemetery at Porto. The presence of the inscriptions could certainly be regarded as indicating that they came from such a cemetery. In the alluvial soil of Porto there could surely have been no catacomb,

[10] De Rossi op. cit. (supra, n. 3), 50; Lugli and Filibeck op. cit. (supra, n. 2), 148.

[11] Ficker op. cit. (supra, n. 8), 31. The drawing in Pl. I, no. 73 does not adequately reproduce the crudeness of the shape of the Menorah.

[12] This is, for example, the view of Frey, Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 86. The contrary view, that there was at least a Synagogue of the Calcaresians at Porto, is expressed by Juster, Les juifs dans l'empire romain (Paris, 1914) I, 415 and La Piana in HThR 20 (1927), 370. Leclercq in DACL 14 (Paris, 1948), 1542 states that Porto had at least two Jewish congregations.

[13] The two inscriptions of known provenience which mention the Synagogue of the Hebrews (CII 291, 317) were found in this catacomb, as were also four mentioning the Synagogue of the Calcaresians (CII 304, 316, 384, 433). In the last of these only the first two letters of the name of the synagogue are preserved, but it is most probable that the restoration Κα[λκαρησίων] is correct rather than Frey's alternative Κα[μπησίων], since the only inscription of certain provenience mentioning the Synagogue of the Campesians (CII 88) was found in the catacomb of Via Appia.

although such distinguished scholars as Samuel Krauss, Seymour de Ricci, and Max Radin referred to a Jewish catacomb as having been found at Porto.[14] As far back as 1866 De Rossi had pointed out that catacombs were impossible in that terrain.[15] In 1931 the late Father Frey, the chief recent investigator of the Jewish antiquities of Rome and its environs, published the claim that he had personally examined at Porto some grave trenches which were part of an ancient Jewish open-air cemetery.[16] Unfortunately, in describing these graves, he cited no material evidence for identifying them as Jewish.

Since the answers to such questions as have been raised must, pending further discoveries, lie primarily in the inscriptions themselves, let us examine them severally. Of the twenty-one items in Frey's collection at least twelve [17] may be eliminated as too fragmentary to be of any value. Six of the latter [18] show no trace of any word or phrase which might identify them as even probably Jewish, so that it is hard to understand why Frey included them at all. Thus our more or less significant inscriptions are reduced to nine, eight of which [19] are now in the Jewish Room (Sala Giudaica) of the Lateran Museum, where they may conveniently be inspected. Most of these were removed to the Lateran from the Bishop's Palace of Porto in 1924 [20] and were added to the collection of other Jewish inscriptions, which comprised chiefly those rescued from the ruined catacomb of Monteverde in 1904 and subsequently. I shall cite first the seven texts which, in my opinion, can without any question be identified as Jewish.

1. (CII 535) ἐντάδε κῖτε | τυγατέρες δύο | πατρὸς τῶν | Ἑβρέων Γα | δίατος. κά | ρα ἐν ἰ | ρήνῃ.

"Here lie the two daughters of the Father of the Hebrews, Gadias. Their heads (be) in peace." [21]

[14] Krauss in Jew. Enc. III, 614; De Ricci ibid. IX, 471; Radin in JQR 7 (1917), 282.

[15] Bull. Arch. Crist. 5 (1866), 44; cf. Frey in Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 90.

[16] Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 89.

[17] CII 542, 544, 546–551e.

[18] CII 546, 549, 550, 551a, d, e.

[19] CII 535–540, 543, 545.

[20] Frey, Riv. Arch. Crist. 7 (1930), 244.

[21] According to Frey, the father's name was Gadia Toskara (earlier, in Riv. Arch. Crist. 8. 85, he had called it Gadia Kara), but Γαδίατος is surely a genitive of Γαδίας. Cf. Ἰούδατος from Ἰούδας (CII 12). In CII 510, where apparently the

In the middle of the first line there is the crude representation of a Menorah, further emphasizing the Judaism of these daughters of the official of a synagogue. The Synagogue of the Hebrews is mentioned also in three inscriptions of Rome, two of which were found among the ruins of the Monteverde catacomb.[22] The epitaph of a certain Salo (CII 510), also the daughter of a Gadias, Father of the Synagogue of the Hebrews, was found in Rome about the middle of the eighteenth century and is now in the Terme Museum. There seems little doubt that the same Gadias is involved. The formula *κάρα ἐν εἰρήνῃ* is unique among the Jewish inscriptions.

2. (CII 543) In the space which had been left blank on the upper part of the same stone a second epitaph was added later:

ἐνθάδει κε͂ | τι Σάρρα | μετὰ τοῦ | υἱοῦς αὐτῆς | ἐν εἰρι.

"Here lies Sarra with her son. In peace." [23]

3. (CII 536) *ἐνθάδαι | κεῖται | Δώρεις. | ἐν ἰρήνῃ ἡ κοί | μησις αὐτῆς.*

"Here lies Doris. In peace be her sleep."

Here the familiar closing formula, which is found almost exclusively in Jewish inscriptions, is seen in its complete version. A conspicuous Menorah attests the Judaism of Doris.

4. (CII 540) On the reverse of this stone we find a similar epitaph:

ἐνθάδε κῖτε | Μαρτίνα. | ἐν ἰρήνῃ | ἡ κοίμησις | αὐτῆς.

"Here lies Martina. In peace be her sleep."

This inscription also is accompanied by a Menorah, the shape of which, with its arms rising at right angles instead of the usual curves, closely resembles that on the other face. The inscription

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same Father of the Hebrews is mentioned, we find the genitive form *Γαδία*, which is analogical to *Τουβία* in CII 497. The grammatical forms in the Jewish sepulchral inscriptions, as in others of the time, are far from consistent. It will be observed that both of the inscriptions involving daughters of Gadias display errors of spelling or grammar and that they differ even in their spelling of the same words:

CII 535: *κιτε, τυγατερες, Εβρεων, ιρηνη*

CII 510: *κειτε, θυγατηρ, Αιβρεων, ειρηνη*

[22] CII 291, 317, 510, of which the first two were found in the catacomb, in 1904 and 1906, respectively; cf. N. Mueller and N. A. Bees, Die Inschriften der juedischen Katakombe am Monteverde zu Rom (Leipzig, 1919), 22, 57.

[23] The shallowness of the cutting would indicate that this inscription was incised after the slab had already been affixed to the closure of the grave of the daughters of Gadias, possibly for a loculus just above. There are indications also that the cutter's tool slipped, presumably because of the awkward position.

was unknown until the back of the slab was revealed when it was removed from the wall of the Bishop's Palace in Porto in 1924. In the Lateran Museum the stone has been fixed on a swivel so that both faces can be read. Father Frey was the first to publish this text.[24]

5. (CII 537) Καττία Ἀμμιὰς θυγάτηρ Μηνοφί | λου πατὴρ συναγωγῆς τῶν | Καρκαρησίων καλῶς βιώσα | σα ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαΐσμῳ ἔτη ζήσασα | τριάκοντα καὶ τέσσαρα μετὰ τοῦ | συμβίου. εἶδεν ἐκ τῶν τέκνων | αὐτῆς ἔγγονα. ὧδε κεῖται Καττία Ἀμμιάς.

"Cattia Ammias, daughter of Menophilus, Father of the Synagogue of the Carcaresians. She lived a good life in Judaism, abiding thirty-four years with her husband. From her children she saw grandchildren. Here lies Cattia Ammias." A strange fact about this inscription is that the right half of the stone had long been at the Lateran Museum while the left half was on the wall of the palace in Porto.[25] Since 1924 the two parts have been reunited in the Sala Giudaica. The Synagogue of the Carcaresians is undoubtedly the same as that of the Calcaresians, which is mentioned on five Roman inscriptions, four of which are known to be from the Monteverde catacomb, while the provenience of the fifth is not recorded.[26] The writing of ρ for λ is either an error of the stonecutter, or it may be a genuine variant in pronunciation.

6. (CII 538) Κλαύδιος | Ἰωσῆς ἄι | χων ἔζη | σεν ἔτη | λε΄.

"Claudius Joses, archon, lived thirty-five years."[27]

[24] Riv. Arch. Crist. 7 (1930), 245.

[25] Derenbourg op. cit. (supra, n. 7), 440.

[26] Cf. supra, n. 13. The inscription of Julianus, gerusiarch of the Calcaresians (CII 504), was one of the first inscriptions to be discovered at Rome, since it was known as early as 1685, when it was published by Spon. See the data in Frey ad loc. Since most of the Jewish inscriptions found in Rome before the discovery of the catacomb of Vigna Randanini on the Via Appia in 1859 came from the Monteverde catacomb, it is virtually certain, in view of the name of the synagogue, that this one also is from there.

[27] Derenbourg op. cit. (supra, n. 7), 438, mistaking the regular nominative form Ἰωσῆς for a genitive, mistranslates "Claudius, son of Joses." Berliner, Gesch. d. Juden in Rom (Frankfurt, 1893), Ch. VI, no. 72, perhaps following Derenbourg, has the same error. De Rossi op. cit. (supra, n. 3), 40, Vogelstein in Vogelstein and Rieger, Gesch. d. Juden in Rom I (Berlin, 1895), 462, no. 21, and Bees op. cit. (supra, n. 22), 83, 163, assume from the name that the inscription belongs to the middle of the first century, that is, the time of the Emperor Claudius, but the names Claudius and Claudia were fairly common among the Jews of ancient Rome and they are found on inscriptions which certainly belong to a later century than the first. Bees op. cit., 163 carelessly cites this inscription for an example of the use of the genitive ἐτῶν with ἔζησεν, whereas the stone clearly reads ἔτη.

The writing of ι for ρ in the word ἄρχων is a stonecutter's slip. In this inscription the common Jewish name Joses and the presence of the title *archon* are sufficient to justify the identification of this man as a Jew.

7. (CII 545) ενθ . . . | κε . . . | ιε . . .

While the text of the inscription is lost except for a portion of the "Here lies" formula, the preserved part of the stone displays a large, carefully carved Menorah, accompanied by four cult objects: the ritual trumpet (*Shofar*), the ritual citrus (*Ethrog*), a flask for oil or wine, and a rootlike vegetable resembling a turnip, such as appears elsewhere among the symbols used by the Roman Jews.[28]

While these seven inscriptions may be regarded as unquestionably Jewish, the two which follow are, to say the least, doubtful:

8. (CII 541) Ῥουφείναι | μονάνδρου | τῇ φιλοτέ | κνων.

"To Rufina, only once married, the loving mother."

While the epithets μόνανδρος and φιλότεκνος occur in the Jewish inscriptions of Rome, they are by no means exclusively Jewish, so that without some definite indication of Judaism this item should not be included in a corpus of Jewish inscriptions.[29] It is still on the wall of the palace at Porto.

9. (CII 539) Μαρκιανε . . . | προαρχων . . . | . . . ρσειο . . .

This fragment, found in Porto in 1866 and presented to the Lateran collection by Prince Torlonia in 1868, has been accepted by scholars as Jewish without question,[30] presumably because of the word προάρχων, but actually there is no mention of such an official as a *proarchon* in any Jewish inscription.[31] Frey points out that the name Marciana is found among the Jews of Rome.[32] This

[28] Frey ad loc. identifies it as a mandragora. Elsewhere (e.g. CII 374) he calls it an *ethrog*. Lietzmann in Beyer and Lietzmann, Die jued. Katak. d. Villa Torlonia in Rom (Berlin, 1930), 20, calls it a *ruebenartige Frucht* without identifying it more precisely. For the use of symbols in the Jewish inscriptions see H. J. Leon, "Symbolic Representations in the Jewish Catacombs of Rome" JAOS 69 (1949), 87–90.

[29] Frey, Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 91–94, thinks that the presence of each of these epithets at least twice in the Jewish inscriptions of Rome makes it certain that this is a Jewish inscription.

[30] E.g. De Rossi (supra, n. 3), 40, Ficker (supra, n. 8) 36, Mueller (supra, n. 22), 4, and repeatedly by Frey.

[31] Mueller loc. cit. (supra, n. 30), thinks it means "former archon." It is not impossible that the letters represent the preposition πρό followed by a proper name, such as Ἀρχωνίδης.

[32] He cites one example, CII 45. He could have added CII 461.

name, however, as Frey himself states, occurs likewise on pagan and Christian inscriptions. There is also the possibility that we have here the very common name Marcia, followed by a second name beginning with *Ne*.[33] In the last part of the preserved portion of the stone Frey reads the familiar formula, found several times on Jewish inscriptions, *θάρσει οὐδεὶς ἀθάνατος* (Be of good courage. Nobody is immortal.) This reading must be rejected here because a careful examination of the stone clearly shows that the letters *ειο* are followed by a horizontal bar which formed the upper part of a letter like Z or T, but certainly no Υ. There is, accordingly, nothing to indicate that this inscription is Jewish and although it has been placed among the Jewish inscriptions in the Lateran, it does not belong there.[34]

All the inscriptions just listed, with the exception of the last one, were part of the collection assembled between 1821 and 1829 by the celebrated statesman of the Church, Cardinal Bartolommeo Pacca (1756–1844), Secretary of State under Pius VII. The inscriptions were embedded in the walls surrounding the *cortile* of his palace at Porto and there they are still to be seen, with the exception of the five stones which were removed in 1924 to be added to the Jewish collection at the Lateran. The value of these inscriptions as a source of information about the Jews of Porto is, unfortunately, vitiated by the undoubted fact that a number of the stones of Cardinal Pacca's collection were not found in Porto at all, but were brought there from Rome. Since there seems to exist no record which will permit us to separate the genuine Porto finds from the importations, it is essential to exercise the caution indicated by Dessau in his introduction to the Latin inscriptions from Ostia and Porto in the fourteenth volume of CIL. There Dessau states that because of the presence of the stones from Rome considerable doubt must be felt about most of

[33] Also possible is *νεπιος* or *νεπια* (for *νήπιος*, etc.), "infant." The spelling *νεπιος* is found in CII 97 and 138.

[34] Among the lesser fragments, one (CII 542) shows the letters ΥΝΑ, possibly part of the word *συναγωγή*; two (544, 551c) have a portion of the common formula *οὐδεὶς ἀθάνατος*; two (547, 551b) show part of the concluding formula of numerous Jewish inscriptions, *ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἡ κοίμησις*; one (548) has ΝΑΓΩΓΩ, probably part of the title *ἀρχισυναγωγός*.

the items allegedly from Porto.[35] He makes an exception, however, of the Jewish inscriptions, which he thinks were probably found at Porto,[36] but he gives no reason to support this opinion. Similarly, Father Frey, while admitting that some of Pacca's inscriptions came from Rome,[37] is confident that the Jewish inscriptions are genuine products of Porto, but he also states no reason for this view.[38] Actually, a strong presumption can be established that the Jewish inscriptions must be included among those which the Cardinal secured in Rome.

In the first place, it has been noted that two of the inscriptions mention synagogues of the Roman Jews, namely those of the Hebrews and of the Calcaresians. While it would not be impossible that some Jews of Porto should have been members of congregations in Transtiberine Rome, which was hardly thirteen miles away, the fact that one of these inscriptions is the epitaph of the two daughters of a certain Gadias, Father of the Synagogue of the Hebrews, while that of another daughter of the same Gadias was found in Rome,[39] would point to the same provenience for the two stones. Frey's explanation, which he insists is the "only plausible" one, is that certain prominent members of the Roman congregations had their homes in Rome and their business establishments in Porto and that if they died while at Porto, they were buried there, but their epitaphs mentioned their congregational offices at Rome.[40] This explanation is hardly convincing, since members of the same family would naturally have been buried in the same cemetery along with other members of the same congregation.

In the second place, it has been noted that while one half of

[35] CIL XIV, p. 3: Sed valde dolendum est quod eis (i.e. the inscriptions found at Porto) miscuit (sc. Pacca) alias ex urbe Roma petitas, in his falsas nonnullas. . . . Nam ita factum est, ut quamquam inscriptionum episcopii Portuensis magnam partem constat esse effossam in Portu, tamen plerasque non sine dubitatione aliqua pro Portuensibus habere possimus.

[36] Ibid., n. 3. He is not positive, however, for after citing a group of inscriptions which are probably from Porto, he adds: Idem fere cadit in inscriptiones Iudaeorum Graecas in episcopio Portuensi adservatas.

[37] Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 84.

[38] Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 85.

[39] Supra, p. 169.

[40] Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 87. Frey's explanation is accepted by Leclercq loc. cit. (supra, n. 12).

the Cattia Ammias inscription, in which the Synagogue of the Calcaresians is mentioned, was at the Lateran in Rome, the other half was in Porto.[41] It is much more likely that the Porto half was carried away from Rome than the reverse. Other inscriptions from the Jewish catacombs of Rome have suffered the same fate. Columbia University, for example, has one half of a slab from the Jewish catacomb of Via Appia, while the other half is still in the catacomb.[42]

Thirdly, the stones themselves differ in no respect from those which were found in the Monteverde catacomb. Slabs of that type would hardly have been used except in a catacomb, but, as has been shown, there could never have been a catacomb of any kind at Porto. If these Porto inscriptions actually came from the Monteverde catacomb, as I believe, their fate was similar to that of a number of other stones which were carried off from the same catacomb prior to the nineteenth century. One group of these passed into the Borgia collection at Velletri, from which place they went to the National Museum at Naples,[43] where presumably they still are, although in the spring and summer of 1951 not even the officials of the Museum were able to locate them, despite a diligent search. Similarly, the Appia catacomb has lost a number of its inscriptions. Besides the fragment at Columbia University, six slabs were carried off to England and are now in Pusey House at Oxford.[44] It is, accordingly, extremely probable that Cardinal Pacca, diligently seeking inscriptions for the collection which he was assembling at Porto and being a man of great prestige, secured these stones, which had been found at the Monteverde catacomb and had come into private hands.[45]

If the inscriptions are eliminated as evidence for a Jewish community at Porto, we are left only with the Jewish graves which

[41] Supra, p. 170.

[42] H. J. Leon, "A Jewish Inscription at Columbia University," AJA 28 (1924), 251–252.

[43] CII 312, 327, 368, 372, 380, 416, 460, 480, 482. It is far from certain, despite Frey, that all of these originated from the Monteverde catacomb, but several of them (CII 327, 368, 372, 416, 460) are certainly from Monteverde.

[44] T. B. L. Webster in JRS 19 (1929), 150–154; cf. L. Robert in REJ 102 (1937), 121 and Hellenica 3 (1946) 97.

[45] It is known that he secured eight inscriptions for his Porto collection from the Collegio Clementino at Rome by reason of his connection with that institution; cf. Dessau in CIL XIV, p. 3, n. 3 and Frey in Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 84–85.

Father Frey claimed to have seen there[46] and the four Menorahs carved on a single capital of the *xenodocheion* of Pammachius.[47] As has been stated above, Frey offers no proof to support his opinion that the graves were those of Jews. He cites not a single inscription or other material object as evidence. As for the Menorahs on the one capital, they are very roughly outlined in a series of dots and scratches, probably executed with a punch and hammer. Frey's confident assertion that the capital was part of a Jewish building, undoubtedly a synagogue, before it was used for the Christian hostelry [48] is hardly tenable. From the crudeness with which the Menorahs are drawn and their occurrence on only one of seven similar capitals, they could hardly have been designed as a decoration for a public building. Besides, when the capital was in its proper place at the top of its column, the Menorahs would have been unnoticed except at close range and in a good light. The occurrence of this symbol of Judaism, inscribed perhaps as a talisman, would point to the presence of some Jew or Jews at the site, possibly even after the collapse of the Christian building in which the columns presumably were used, but it is surely no indication of the existence there of a Jewish structure.

In the neighboring port city of Ostia, with the exception of a single lamp adorned with the Menorah,[49] no positive evidence of the presence of a Jewish group has as yet been discovered, not even a single inscription which can be identified as Jewish. Similarly, with regard to Porto, while it is possible that some Jews lived there at some time or other, we have no evidence whatever that a Jewish community existed there at any time.

[46] Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 89; cf. supra, p. 168.
[47] Supra, pp. 166–67.
[48] Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 84.
[49] Riv. Arch. Crist. 8 (1931), 89, n. 1.

HYPATIUS OF EPHESUS

A NOTE ON IMAGE WORSHIP IN THE SIXTH CENTURY *

In a recent article Professor Norman H. Baynes discussed the evidence for opposition to religious art prior to the outbreak of the Iconoclastic Controversy.[1] In the course of his illuminating article, he called attention to an important fragment of patristic literature which was first published in recent years and which but for Professor Baynes might have remained unnoticed. It is an excerpt taken from the Miscellaneous Enquiries (Συμμικτὰ Ζητήματα) by Hypatius of Ephesus, who was archbishop of this most important see from 531 to about 538 and in addition one of Justinian's most trusted theological advisers.[2] Professor Baynes used the text to illustrate the fact that prior to the Iconoclastic Controversy "any general cult of the icons in such extreme forms as later appears in the apologies of the iconodules would seem dangerous and a wrongful use of a practice which was tolerated only in the interest of the weaker members of the church." (p. 95). The text, however, is

* Professor Ernst Kantorowicz, of the Institute for Advanced Study, has kindly read the typescript of this article and discussed it with the writer. He has made several important suggestions for which I wish to thank him in this place. The author is also grateful to Professor A. D. Nock for several helpful suggestions. The article was written while the author was a fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and a member of the Institute for Advanced Study.

[1] Baynes, Norman H., "The Icons before Iconoclasm," Harvard Theological Review XLIV (1951), 93–106, esp. 93–95.

[2] Ed. Diekamp, Franz, "Analecta Patristica etc.," in Orientalia Christiana Analecta CXVII (1938), pp. 127–129 (text), pp. 118–120 (commentary). The edition is based on Paris. gr. 1115, ff. 254^{v}–255^{v}, written A.D. 1276. The ms. is interesting from the paleographical point of view. It contains a collection of dogmatic florilegia. In the colophon the thirteenth century scribe states that it was copied from a codex "found in the old library of the Holy Church of the Older Rome, which codex was itself written in the year 6267" (=759 A.D.). On this ms. see Melioranski, B. M., Georgii Kiprianin i Ioann Ierusalimlianin etc., in Zapiski istoriko — filologicheskago fakulteta imperatorskago S.-Peterburgskago universiteta LIX (1901), pp. 78ff. and Schermann, Theodor, Die Geschichte der dogmatischen Florilegien etc., Texte und Untersuchungen, N.F. XIII (1904), 6–10, with the corrections made by Fr. Diekamp in his review of Schermann's book (Theologische Revue IV [1905], 445–450) and in Diekamp's edition of the Doctrina Patrum (Münster i. W., 1907), p. xx. In his review (col. 449) Diekamp cautions us, rightly, against accepting the evidence of the colophon at face value. Yet for the part of the ms. which interests us here only extraordinary circumstances, such as provenance from an outlying region, could account for the fact that a thirteenth century ms. preserves a passage in favor of image worship which had escaped all the iconophile writers during the one hundred and twenty-odd years of the Iconoclastic Controversy. In P.G. CIX 499–516 (=P.G. XCVI 1347–1362) an *Invectiva contra Haereticos* was edited from this codex, see (Combefis'?) *prolusio*.

also important from other points of view. Since it is difficult Greek and since the trend of Hypatius' thought, though entirely logical, may not be clear at first sight, it is advisable to submit here a translation of the document, accompanied by explanatory notes. The writer gratefully acknowledges that he owes much to Diekamp and Baynes for an understanding of the document.

"Hypatius archbishop of Ephesus, from the Miscellaneous Enquiries addressed to Julian bishop of Atramytium, Book One, Chapter Five, concerning the objects in sacred buildings.[3]

You say that those who set up in the sanctuaries what is revered and worshipped, in the form of paintings and carvings alike, are once again disturbing divine tradition.[4] And you say that you understand clearly that the Sayings [of the Bible] [5] prohibit this, that is, they prohibit not only to make [carvings] but even ordain that they be destroyed [6] once they are coming or have come into existence.

We must examine why the Sayings state this, and at the same time consider for what purpose the sacred objects [7] are moulded in the way in which they [actually] are. For inasmuch as certain people believed that, as Holy Scripture says, "the divine nature is like gold or silver or stone or the imprint of the art of man," [8] and improvised in accordance with their view material gods and "worshipped what he had created, instead of the Creator," [9] it is said: "Tear down their altars" [10] and "cut down," [11] and "the carved images of their gods you must burn up," [12] and "watch your souls well (since you knew no likeness on the day when the Lord spoke to you at Mount Horeb out of the fire), that you do not act perniciously by carving an image for yourselves." [13] For no existing thing is like or identical or the same as the good and divine Trinity which transcends all existing things and is the creator and cause of all existing things, for it is said

[3] *περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις οἴκοις.* The term "church" is not used at all in our fragment. Instead we find everywhere, except in the title, *τὰ ἱερά*, which I translate "sanctuaries." Are the *ἅγιοι οἶκοι* churches, or sacred buildings of a more general or more specialized character? The term occurs, in the sense of "church building," in a fragment attributed, perhaps wrongly, to St. Epiphanius, see Georg Ostrogorsky, Studien zur Geschichte des byzantinischen Bilderstreites, Breslau, 1929, pp. 67 ff. (frg. III 6, p. 68).

[4] *παρακινεῖν δὲ αὖθις φὴς τὴν θείαν παράδοσιν τοὺς ὁμοίως τὰ σεπτὰ καὶ προσκυνητὰ γραφαῖς ἢ γλυφαῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀνατιθέντας.* Julian says that this is done "once again" (*αὖθις*) because it had been done a first time by the pagans.

[5] Ex. 20:4–5 and similar passages. [In my translation, I have used as basis for the rendering of biblical passages the Chicago translation, but adjusted it where the Septuagint differs from the Hebrew or where Hypatius, who is quoting from memory, differs from the text of the Greek Bible. The biblical passages have been identified by Diekamp.]

[6] Reading *καθαιρεῖν* (for *καθαίρειν*). Cf. Diekamp p. 118 ". . . die vorhandenen zu *zerstören* befehle."

[7] Here *τὰ ἱερὰ* does not mean "sanctuaries" but "sacred objects." Cf. note 3.

[8] Acts 17:29.

[9] Romans 17:25.

[10] Deut. 7:5.

[11] Deut. 7:25.

[12] Deut. 7:25.

[13] Deut. 4:15–16.

"who is like thee?",[14] and we hear the divines sing "who will be likened to Thee?"[15]

But since this is so, you say: We allow the paintings to be worshipped in the sanctuaries but we who often prohibit carvings in wood and stone do not allow this [sculpture] either to be sinless [i.e. like paintings] except on the doors.[16]

Yet, oh beloved and holy man,[17] we own and record that, whatever the divine essence be, it is not like, or identical with, or the same as any of the existing things. We ordain that the unspeakable and incomprehensible love of God for us men and the sacred patterns set by the Saints be celebrated in holy writings[18] since so far as we are concerned we take no pleasure at all in sculpture or painting. But we permit simpler people, as they are less perfect, to learn by way of initiation about such things by [the sense of] sight which is more appropriate to their natural development, especially as we find that, often and in many respects, even old and new divine commandments lower themselves to the level of weaker people and their souls for the sake of their salvation.[19] Indeed even the holy priest Moses, who issued these laws on God's prompting, sets up, in the Holiest of Holies, golden images of the Cherubim in beaten work.[20] And in many other instances we see

[14] Ps. 70:19 (Sept.).

[15] Ps. 82:2 (Sept.).

[16] This is a difficult and important sentence: *ἀλλὰ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων φῄς· προσκυνητὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἑῶμεν εἶναι γραφάς, ἐπὶ ξύλου δὲ καὶ λίθου πολλάκις οἱ τὰ τῆς γλυφῆς ἀπαγορεύοντες οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλημμελὲς ἑῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ θυραῖς.* Diekamp, p. 118 comments: "Das . . . Fragment . . . handelt . . . von den heiligen Gemälden und Skulpturen in den Gotteshäusern. Der Bischof Julian hatte das Bedenken, das Anbringen solcher Bildwerke [I suppose Diekamp means: of sacred paintings and sculptures] in den Kirchen sei gegen die Überlieferung und gegen die heilige Schrift. . . . Höchstens auf den Türvorhängen will er Malereien zulassen, nicht auf Holz oder Stein, auch keine Skulpturen." According to Baynes, p. 94, Julian "will allow representations (*γραφάς*) in the churches but none on wood or stone and no sculpture. These *γραφαί* may be on the door-curtains (*ἐπὶ θυραῖς*: I suppose this is how the words must be translated), but no more is permissible." But clearly Julian distinguished paintings (*γραφαί*) from carvings (*τὰ τῆς γλυφῆς*). He does not prohibit the paintings, although his approval seems somewhat grudging (*ἑῶμεν*); he merely objects to those who set up "what is revered and worshipped in the form of paintings and carvings *equally*" (above note 4). The *ἐπὶ θυραῖς* must therefore refer to sculptural decoration of the doors, not to door-curtains. The *οὐδὲ τοῦτο* I take to mean that Julian permits paintings, but he will not *in addition* approve of carved works.

[17] The ms. reads *ὀφείλη καὶ ἡ ἱερὰ κεφαλή*. Diekamp proposes *ὦ θεῖα καὶ ἱερὰ κεφαλή* which seems unnecessarily violent. I suggest: *ὦ φίλη καὶ ἱερὰ κεφαλή*.

[18] The text is corrupt. The ms. reads: *τὴν ἄρρητον δὲ καὶ ἀπερίληπτον εἰς ἡμᾶς τοῦ Θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ τοὺς ἱεροὺς τῶν ἁγίων εἰκόνας ἐν γράμμασι μὲν ἡμεῖς ἱεροῖς ἀνευφημεῖσθαι διατυποῦμεν κτλ.* Diekamp emends *τοὺς ἱερούς* into *τὰς ἱερὰς*. Professor Kantorowicz calls my attention to the use of *εἰκών* in the sense of "example" or "pattern." In fact, Liddell and Scott, *verbo εἰκών*, refers to [Timaeus Locrus] De Anima Mundi et Naturae, ed. C. F. Hermann, 99D where the demiurge creates mortal beings *ἵν' ᾖ τέλεος ποτὶ τὰν εἰκόνα παντελῶς ἀπειργασμένος* (sc. *ὁ κόσμος*) and where *εἰκών* is used in the sense of "archetype" or "pattern." Baynes (p. 94) takes the *γράμματα ἱερά* to be "sacred representations." But Hypatius uses *γραφαί* in the sense of "paintings" and *γράμμα* in the sense of "writing."

[19] A difficult phrase: *καὶ αὐτὰς πολλάκις καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς τὰς θείας παλαιάς τε καὶ νέας διατάξεις εὑρόντες τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν συγκατακλινομένας.* (I have translated the last word in the light of *κατακλίνεται* p. 128:19= Diekamp.) Yet the sense is clear from the illustrations which follow in the text.

[20] Exodus 25:18. Should we write *τορευτὰς* (for *τορνευτὰς*)?

the divine wisdom in saving love of men sometimes remit the strictness for those souls which still need guidance. And for this reason it is said that even magi were led to Christ by a star of heaven at the time of His earthly birth.[21] [Scripture] leads Israel away from sacrifices to the idols but allows them to make these [sacrifices] to God.[22] And it names a certain "Queen of the Heavens"[23] although there exists no other king except Him who truly is king of kings in heaven and on earth. But it also mentions stars and uses pagan Greek language [as well as concepts],[24] calling some of them Pleiad and Bear and Orion,[25] but it does not lower itself to any of the myths and stories told about them by the Greeks, since it knows well and sings the praise of Him who "numbers the multitude of the stars and gives names to all of them."[26] It teaches those who cannot otherwise learn them, the same stars with the help of the nomenclature which they know and use. For these reasons we, too, allow even material adornment in the sanctuaries, not because we believe that God considers gold and silver and silken vestments and gem-studded vessels venerable and sacred but because we permit each order of the faithful to be guided and led up to the divine being in a manner appropriate to it [the order] because we think that some people are guided even by these [gold, silver, etc.] towards the intelligible beauty and from the abundant light in the sanctuaries to the intelligible and immaterial light.[27]

And yet some who have pondered about the higher life have held that "in every place" spiritual worship should be offered to God and that holy souls are the temples of God.[28] For the Sayings are said to speak thus:[29] "I want the men in every place to offer prayer lifting to heaven hands that are holy,"[30] and "Bless the Lord in every place of his dominion,"[31] and it is said: "The heavens are my throne, and the earth is my footstool,"[32] and "What house can you build for me?

[21] Matthew 2:9.

[22] Exodus 34:13; Leviticus 1–7. The ms. reads: *τὸν δὲ Ἰσραὴλ ἀπάγει μὲν θυσιῶν εἰδώλων, ἐνδίδωσι δὲ ταύτας τῷ θεῷ θύειν.* I see no reason to emend, with Diekamp, *ταύτας* to *ταῦτα*. It refers to *θυσιῶν*.

[23] Jeremiah 51:17 (Sept.).

[24] *συνεξελληνίζουσα τῇ φωνῇ.* There is, of course, here the ambiguity of the word "Hellen" which means "Greek" as well as "pagan."

[25] Job 9:9; 38:31.

[26] Ps. 146:4 (Sept.).

[27] *ὥς τινων καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπὶ τὴν νοητὴν εὐπρέπειαν χειραγωγουμένων καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ ἱερὰ πολλοῦ φωτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ ἄϋλον φῶς.* I have discussed the meaning of the last sentence at some length with Professor Kantorowicz. It represents, as it were, the application of what precedes. Just as Scripture had made certain concessions to the uneducated, so the clergy ("we") has permitted the adornment of the Churches with all kinds of beautiful objects.

[28] *καίτοιγέ τισι τῶν τὴν ὑψηλοτέραν ζωὴν φιλοσοφησάντων καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ τὴν ἐν πνεύματι λατρείαν θεῷ προσάγειν ἔδοξε καὶ ναοὺς εἶναι θεοῦ τὰς ὁσίας ψυχάς.* This is a reference to the famous argument, repeated by many theologians since the days of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, that the only true image of Christ is the virtuous (just, pious, etc.) soul. I intend to deal with it in a larger context. For the moment I merely refer to the stimulating article by Florovsky, George, "Origen, Eusebius, and the Iconoclastic Controversy," Church History XIX (1950) 3–22, esp. p. 17 f.

[29] *φησιν εἰρηκέναι τὰ λόγια.* Should we emend into *φασιν*, i.e. those *τινες* "who have pondered about the higher life"?

[30] I Tim. 2:8.

[31] Psalms 102:22 (Sept.).

[32] Isaiah 66:1.

says the Lord,"[33] and "Was it not my hand that made it all?"[34] and the Highest "does not live in temples built by human hands,"[35] and "For whom shall I have regard if not for the one who is gentle and quiet and who trembles at my word?"[36] and "He who loves me will observe my teaching, and I shall love him, and I and my Father will come and live with him."[37] For Paul says to the Saints: "You are God's temple, and God's spirit makes its home in you."[38]

We do not, then, disturb the divine [commandments] with regard to the sanctuaries but we stretch out our hand in a more suitable way to those who are still rather imperfect, yet we do not leave them untaught as to the more perfect [knowledge] but we want even them to know that the divine being is not at all identical or the same or similar to any of the existing things."

The translation and the notes have, I trust, made clear both the trend of the thought and the intention of the author. Julian of Atramytium had been concerned about the use and worship of religious images, presumably in his diocese. His objections had been based on the Old Testament prohibitions of art (Ex. 20:5, etc.). Julian had, however, not questioned the use and worship of religious *paintings* at all. He had approved, though perhaps somewhat grudgingly, both their use and the practise of prostration (προσκύνησις) before painted images (cf. note 16). Julian had objected, however, to religious *sculpture*. Hypatius, in replying to these scruples of his suffragan, examines the reason for the Old Testament prohibitions, as well as the reasons for the legitimacy of Christian sculpture. The Old Testament prohibitions were meant for people who believed in the similarity or identity of cult-statues on the one hand and the Divine on the other. The Christians of the sixth century are no longer in danger of accepting such a view. Therefore Hypatius will permit the use of religious sculpture for the uneducated although he himself, as a learned theologian, maintains that the true praise of God and of the Saints must continue to be performed by the written word. For the benefit of the uneducated, Hypatius even thinks that acts of worship before sacred paintings and sculptures[39] will serve a useful pedagogical purpose. He then passes in review a number of instances where the Bible itself records concessions to the uneducated. Hypatius declares himself in full agreement with those

[33] Isaiah 66:1.
[34] Acts 7:49.
[35] Acts 17:24.
[36] Isaiah 66:2.
[37] John 14:23.
[38] I Cor. 3:16.
[39] There may be some doubt whether Hypatius authorizes the *worship* (not only the use) of religious *sculpture*. Yet when he anticipates the objection of "some who have pondered about the higher life," he makes them proponents of "spiritual *worship*." The target of their protest, therefore, are all other (non-spiritual) kinds of worship.

who recognize only acts of spiritual worship performed by holy souls. Yet he feels that his concession will not vitiate this requirement as long as the clergy constantly emphasizes to the simpler people Hypatius' oft-repeated principle as to the total difference of material objects and divine being.

If my interpretation of the fragment has merits, a number of interesting conclusions follow:

(1) Baynes is, of course, quite correct when he emphasizes the hesitations which both Julian and Hypatius show in their attitude towards religious images. It also is true that neither Julian nor Hypatius allow more than pedagogical functions for the images. In particular, not a word is said about any miraculous power residing in them.

(2) There is, at least on the part of Julian, a much greater hesitancy towards religious sculpture than towards Christian paintings. This is interesting, in view of the almost complete absence of religious sculpture in the Byzantine Church after the restoration of images.

(3) But it is at least as interesting that neither Julian nor Hypatius as much as raise the question of the legitimacy not only of using but even of *worshipping* religious *paintings*. In all probability, individual acts of worship had occurred much earlier without objection from the clergy. Yet this is, to the best of my knowledge, the earliest [40] clear evidence of official approval, on the part of two members of the higher clergy, one of them even prominent.[41] If from Julian's and Hypatius' attitude towards painted images inferences may be drawn as to the

[40] I know of only one earlier text: certain craftsmen in fifth century Rome seem to have attributed an apotropaic effect to images of Symeon the Older Stylite (+459/60), and the historian who reports this feature *may* share this feeling (Theodoret, hist. rel. 25, PG 82, 1473 A, cf. Holl, Karl, "Der Anteil der Styliten am Aufkommen der Bilderverehrung," in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte II, Tübingen, 1928, 390). Yet this case is quite different from that at Atramytium: (1) the Roman images of Symeon are set up in craftshops not in churches; and (2) no ritual act of worship (prostration) is reported. Basil's letter 360 (PG 32, 1100B) is probably spurious; cf. Elliger, Walter, Die Stellung der alten Christen zu den Bildern etc., in Studien über christliche Denkmäler XX (1930) p. 61. Bréhier, Louis, La Querelle des Images, Paris, 1904, p. 7f. cites no other approval of image worship prior to the seventh century.

[41] Holl, loc. cit., 388: "Angesichts der Schärfe, mit der das Christentum sich ursprünglich gegen die Idole und ihre Verehrung wendete, bleibt es immer überraschend, wie ungehindert und fast unbeachtet sich später der heidnische Brauch in der Kirche selbst festsetzen konnte. Nur gegen den ersten noch harmlosen Schritt in dieser Richtung, gegen die aufkommende Sitte, Bilder in den Kirchen auzubringen, hat sich im 4. Jahrhundert ein gewisser Protest erhoben. Der schlimmere, zweite Schritt, die Herübernahme der heidnischen Auffassung und Verehrung des Bildes, ist ohne solchen Widerspruch erfolgt. . . . Syrien und Kleinasien sind, sofern nicht alles trügt, in unserem Fall die Länder gewesen, wo der Gang der Dinge sich entschied."

feelings of the high clergy in the capital of the Empire, new light is shed on the appearance of images, one generation later, on the columns separating the sanctuary from the choir in Justinian's newly rebuilt Church of St. Sophia — of images of Christ among the angels, of Christ among the prophets, of Christ among the apostles, and of the Virgin Mary.[42]

(4) Hypatius, however, does not stop at religious paintings but sanctions likewise the use and worship (cf. note 39) of religious sculpture towards which the Byzantine Church always had felt, and continued to feel, greater scruples than towards the painted icons.

The reader of Hypatius' remarks will inevitably be reminded of a kindred document from the West which dates not quite a century after the new fragment and which has always played a large rôle in discussions of attitudes towards religious art: the letter of Pope Gregory the Great to Serenus, bishop of Marseille.[43] Serenus had broken the images of some Saints to prevent people from worshipping them. Pope Gregory writes that he would have praised his correspondent if he had merely prohibited their worship but now blames him for having broken them.[44] Like Hypatius, Gregory recognizes that the images have a pedagogical function, especially for pagans.[45] Yet how fundamental is the difference between the archbishop of Ephesus and his suffragan on the one hand, and the Roman Pope, two generations later, and the bishop of Marseille on the other! In the first place, Serenus had taken immediate action and broken the images while Julian was much more cautious and consulted his superior before he acted. Are we dealing here just with two different individual temperaments? Or is Serenus' behavior char-

[42] Paulus Silentiarius, Description of the Temple of Holy Wisdom, verses 668ff., ed. Friedländer, Paul, Leipzig and Berlin, 1912, p. 246f. and 287–289. The poem dates of the year 563. The columns, it seems, were not part of a regular iconostasis, but the prominent position of the icons, on a part of the church which clearly was the forerunner of the later iconostases, recommended them to the special attention of the congregation.

[43] Gregorius Magnus, Epistolae, XI, 10, ed. L. M. Hartmann, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolarum Tomus II (Berlin, 1899) pp. 269ff. The letter dates from October 600. For comment, see Koch, Hugo, Die altchristliche Bilderfrage, in Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments XXVII (1917), p. 77ff. (where other texts from the same author about religious images are cited). It is difficult to say whether Serenus had "broken" sculptures or paintings, but the former is perhaps more likely.

[44] Loc. cit.: *Et quidem quia eas adorari vetuisses, omnino laudavimus; fregisse vero reprehendimus.*

[45] Loc. cit.: *Aliud est enim picturam adorare, aliud per picturae historia, quid sit adorandum, addiscere. Nam quod legentibus scriptura, hoc idiotis praestat pictura cernentibus, quia in ipsa ignorantes vident quod sequi debeant, in ipsa legunt qui litteras nesciunt; unde praecipue gentibus pro lectione pictura est.*

acteristic for the energetic Western missionary to the heathens while Julian's is typical for the bishop of a region where Hellenic Christianity had been the established religion since times immemorial? Or, finally, is the trend towards image worship much stronger in the diocese of Atramytium so that Julian has to assure himself of support before taking action? Possibly all these factors have to be taken into account together to explain the different behavior of Julian and Serenus. But Hypatius and Gregory take as different an attitude as Julian and Serenus. Hypatius had permitted acts of worship before the images; Gregory explicitly prohibits them. More important even, Hypatius had approved of Christian images as means of spiritual, perhaps even mystical, pedagogy which would guide men towards "the intelligible and immaterial light." Gregory, on the other hand, sees in the images pedagogical devices through which a pagan could learn to worship the Christian God rather than his heathen gods and in which he could find patterns of conduct — in a word, devices for practical and moral instruction. A comparison of the two documents demonstrates clearly a fundamentally different attitude towards the images between East and West. Yet both in the Ephesian and the Roman documents we see at work the powerful force of popular piety which, in the East at any rate, was to impose concession after concession upon the theologians,[46] until in the eighth and ninth centuries the Iconoclastic Controversy probed all the theological and philosophical depths of the issue.

[46] Holl, loc. cit., p. 389: "Erst in zweiter Linie ist die Theologie an diesem Prozess [i.e. the development of image worship] beteiligt. Sie hat nicht geschoben, aber — was vielleicht ebenso wichtig war — das Gefühl für das, was vorging, abgeschwächt und das sich behauptende Heidentum mit ihren Prinzipien gedeckt."

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